<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087</id><updated>2011-08-16T20:04:07.869-07:00</updated><title type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon</title><subtitle type='html'>This is a collection of the &lt;u&gt;Legal Theory Lexicon&lt;/u&gt; posts from &lt;u&gt;Legal Theory Blog&lt;/u&gt;.  A new entry appears each week on Sunday.  The most recent posts appear on this page.  To access older posts use the "Table of Contents" below.  (Many of the Legal Theory Lexicon posts have benefitted from comments by Ken Simons of the Boston University School of Law.)</subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>51</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-116377417867456584</id><published>2007-02-09T06:35:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2007-03-09T15:59:32.815-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Location for Legal Theory Blog
The Legal Theory Lexicon is part of Legal Theory Blog. The new location for Legal Theory Blog is: http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/116377417867456584'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/116377417867456584'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2006/11/new-location-for-legal-theory-blog.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-115365519736279684</id><published>2006-07-23T04:45:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-07-23T04:46:37.680-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>New Location for the Legal Theory Lexicon Archives
The new location for the archives of the Legal Theory Lexicon is:http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/115365519736279684'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/115365519736279684'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2006/07/new-location-for-legal-theory-lexicon.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-112126941216147735</id><published>2005-07-10T08:42:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2005-07-13T13:56:56.223-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 049: Distributive JusticeIntroduction
Distributive justice is one of the central topics of political philosophy and plays a key role in contemporary debates about normative legal theory.  Should contract law take distributive consequences into account?  Should tort law aim at "risk spreading"?  Should the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution be read as </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/112126941216147735'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/112126941216147735'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/07/legal-theory-lexicon-049-distributive.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-111983322239734985</id><published>2005-06-26T17:46:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2005-06-26T17:49:24.416-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 048: Libertarian Theories of LawIntroduction
The dominant approaches to normative legal theory in the American legal academy converge on fairly robust role for the state and government subject to the constraints imposed by an equally robust set of individual rights.  Normative legal theorists of all stripes--conservatives and liberals, welfarists and deontologists—tend to </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111983322239734985'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111983322239734985'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/06/legal-theory-lexicon-048-libertarian.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-111923575533219475</id><published>2005-06-19T19:47:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-07-09T08:36:11.216-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 047: The Counter-Majoritarian DifficultyIntroduction
The counter-majoritarian difficulty may be the best known problem in constitutional theory.  The phrase is attributed to Alexander Bickel—a Yale Law School Professor—who is said to have introduced it in his famous book The Least Dangerous Branch.  Whatever Bickel actually meant by the phrase, it has now taken on a life of </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111923575533219475'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111923575533219475'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/06/legal-theory-lexicon-047-counter.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-111862918251856932</id><published>2005-06-12T19:19:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-07-02T04:35:12.186-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 046: LegitimacyIntroduction
Legitimacy.  It’s a word much bandied about by students of the law.  “Bush v. Gore was an illegitimate decision.” “The Supreme Court’s implied fundamental rights jurisprudence lacks legitimacy.”  “The invasion of Iraq does not have a legitimate basis in international law.”  We’ve all heard words like these uttered countless times, but what do they </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111862918251856932'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111862918251856932'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/06/legal-theory-lexicon-046.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-111802915266227598</id><published>2005-06-05T20:38:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2005-06-05T20:40:19.256-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 045: The Attitudinal Model &amp; the New Institutionalism
Introduction
The legal academy is not the only locus for serious study of the law.  Legal phenomena are examined in a variety of other disciplines—ranging from philosophy and sociology to history and anthropology, but political science (or “politics” or “government”) is the academic discipline that is most strongly </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111802915266227598'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111802915266227598'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/06/legal-theory-lexicon-045-attitudinal.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-111743605494823797</id><published>2005-05-29T23:54:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2005-05-29T23:54:14.956-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 044: Legal Theory, Jurisprudence, and the Philosophy of LawIntroduction
The Legal Theory Lexicon series usually explicates some concept in legal theory, jurisprudence, or philosophy of law.  But what are those fields and how do they relate to each other?  Is “jurisprudence” a synonym for “philosophy of law” or are these two overlapping but distinct fields?  Is “legal theory” </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111743605494823797'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111743605494823797'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-044-legal-theory.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-111679653810268588</id><published>2005-05-22T14:10:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2005-05-22T14:15:38.113-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 043: Formalism and InstrumentalismIntroduction
American law students learn about formalism instrumentalism early on—although those particular terms may not be introduced.  Many law students hunger for “black letter law,” for legal rules that can be applied to the facts in a more or less determinate fashion.  But in most law school classrooms, this hunger is not satisfied.  </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111679653810268588'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/111679653810268588'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-043-formalism-and.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-110047608178008895</id><published>2004-11-14T15:45:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-06-11T05:23:01.573-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 042: ConsentIntroduction
Most law students begin realize that consent is a powerful legal and moral concept early in the first year of law school.  A physical blow to the person is a battery—unless the blow was landed in a boxing match, in which case consent turns the battery into something that is legally permissible and not actionable, even if it results in serious harm.  </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/110047608178008895'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/110047608178008895'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/11/legal-theory-lexicon-042.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108775694784845139</id><published>2004-06-20T11:42:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-05-28T15:15:58.583-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 041: MetaethicsIntroduction
Suppose that we are debating a question in normative legal theory--e.g., whether gay couples should have a constitutional right to marry or whether tort law should replace the negligence standard with strict liability.  In debates about what the law ought to be, two kinds of questions can arise.  There are first order questions, e.g. the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108775694784845139'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108775694784845139'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/06/legal-theory-lexicon-041.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108733310714535599</id><published>2004-06-13T13:58:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2005-05-08T11:00:46.836-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 040: Functional Explanation in Legal TheoryIntroduction
In a prior installment of the Legal Theory Lexicon, we explored the difference between Positive and Normative Legal Theories.  Positive legal theory attempts to explain and predict legal behavior, especially the content of legal rules.  Normative legal theory makes claims about what those rules should be.  This week's </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108733310714535599'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108733310714535599'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/06/legal-theory-lexicon-040-functional.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108663673917076037</id><published>2004-06-06T23:50:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2005-05-01T19:21:56.480-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 039: Primary and Secondary RulesIntroduction
Most law students begin to notice that there is a fundamental difference between the kinds of legal rules that come up in torts &amp; criminal law, on the one hand, and the sorts of legal rules that arise in contracts, on the other.  The rules of criminal law seem to define standards of conduct; they are about what you can and cannot </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108663673917076037'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108663673917076037'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/06/legal-theory-lexicon-039-primary-and.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108601294151636421</id><published>2004-05-30T07:15:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2004-05-31T07:16:01.146-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 038: The Internal Point of ViewIntroduction
How can we look at a legal system?  H.L.A. Hart famously deployed the distinction between external and internal perspectives on a legal system in his famous book, The Concept of Law.  This post provides a very brief introduction to this distinction for law students (especially first-year law students) with an interest in legal </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108601294151636421'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108601294151636421'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/05/legal-theory-lexicon-038-internal.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108558946461168583</id><published>2004-05-23T09:37:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2004-05-26T09:38:53.823-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 037: Overlapping Consensus &amp; Incompletely Theorized AgreementsIntroduction
As law students become more sophisticated, they begin to notice that certain debates seem to repeat themselves over and over again.  Disagreements about disparate subjects--in procedure, criminal law, torts, property, and constitutional law--frequently seem to turn on the really big questions of </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108558946461168583'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108558946461168583'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/05/legal-theory-lexicon-037-overlapping.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108471805452266048</id><published>2004-05-16T07:34:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2004-05-16T11:39:08.546-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 036: IndeterminacyIntroduction
It all depends on your first year section, but many law students begin to get a sinking feeling about the law early in their first year.  Does the law actually make any difference to the way cases are decided?  Before law school, most of us would answer "Yes, of course."  And many law students start law school with the assumption that they will</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108471805452266048'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108471805452266048'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/05/legal-theory-lexicon-036.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108471800858709350</id><published>2004-05-09T05:32:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-16T05:01:28.853-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 035: Strict Construction &amp; Judicial ActivismIntroduction
This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon is a bit unusual.  Rather than explicating concepts that are important to legal theory, the point of this post is to debunk two concepts that are unimportant (or even meaningless), strict construction and judicial activism.
Strict Construction
Strict construction is short hand for </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108471800858709350'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108471800858709350'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/05/legal-theory-lexicon-035-strict.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108412598575522388</id><published>2004-05-02T11:06:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2004-05-09T11:09:42.090-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 034: HohfeldIntroduction
You need to know Hohfeld.  Why?  Because W.N. Hohfeld’s typology of rights from his book Fundamental Legal Conceptions is, well, fundamental.  And useful!
Law students encounter the idea of right (moral or legal) early and often.  But “rights talk” is frequently “loose talk.”  Hohfeld is famous for exposing the ambiguity in the concept of a right </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108412598575522388'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108412598575522388'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/05/legal-theory-lexicon-034.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108412593195760464</id><published>2004-04-25T11:05:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-04-02T16:16:17.033-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 033: HolismIntroduction
Our topic this week is “holism,” more particularly the idea that theories of the law are (or “should be” or “can be”) holistic.  Legal holism can be captured in a famous slogan, “The law is a seamless web,” and the contemporary legal theorist who is most associated with legal holism is Ronald Dworkin.
As always, the Legal Theory Lexicon is aimed at law</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108412593195760464'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108412593195760464'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/04/legal-theory-lexicon-033.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-10823402405700549</id><published>2004-04-18T19:04:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-03-26T11:39:02.496-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 032: Fit and JustificationIntroduction
In 1975, Ronald Dworkin wrote Hard Cases (88 Harvard Law Review 1057 (1975) reprinted in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously ch 4 (Harvard University Press, 1977)).  This is one of the most famous and influential articles in contemporary legal theory, and I would put it very high on my recommended legal-theory reading list.  Lot's of</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/10823402405700549'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/10823402405700549'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/04/legal-theory-lexicon-032-fit-and.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108170346624977963</id><published>2004-04-11T10:11:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2006-03-19T07:06:52.513-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 031: Virtue JurisprudenceIntroduction
Law students with a background in philosophy are sure to notice the strong influence of moral philosophy on legal thinking.  Theories like Kant's have had a profound influence on the idea of fairness in legal theory and on the conception of rights that is at the heart of deontological legal theory.  Utilitarianism and the law reform </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108170346624977963'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108170346624977963'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/04/legal-theory-lexicon-031-virtue.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108169832522315548</id><published>2004-04-04T08:45:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2005-02-27T08:28:09.213-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 030: TextualismIntroduction
One of the most important topics in legal theory is “legal interpretation,” the theory of the derivation of meaning from legal texts.  Of course, legal interpretation is a very large topic, with several different dimensions and approaches.  This post will focus on “textualism,” and provide some introductory ideas about interpretive theory in </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108169832522315548'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108169832522315548'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/04/legal-theory-lexicon-030.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-108076845322201387</id><published>2004-03-28T13:27:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-02-20T08:19:31.103-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 029: Public and Private GoodsIntroduction
One of the most powerful ideas that legal theory borrows from economics is the idea of a "public good."  Sooner or later law students learn that within the framework of contemporary neoclassical economics, the standard line is that public goods (e.g. national security) should be provided by government whereas private goods (</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108076845322201387'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/108076845322201387'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/03/legal-theory-lexicon-029-public-and.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107990280008463848</id><published>2004-03-21T13:00:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-02-14T13:23:44.253-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 028: Concepts and ConceptionsIntroduction
Some ideas seem to be endlessly debated.  We might all agree that "justice" is a good thing, but some of us think that justice boils down to counting the utility of each individual equally, while others think that justice is a matter of respecting basic human rights.  Utilitarians might all agree that maximizing expected utility </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107990280008463848'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107990280008463848'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/03/legal-theory-lexicon-028-concepts-and.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107930843982040364</id><published>2004-03-14T15:53:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2004-03-14T16:08:40.966-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 027: PersonhoodIntroduction
Are the unborn human persons?  What is the difference between legal and moral personhood?  What does it mean to say that a corporation is a legal person?  Do the most intelligent animals deserve the rights of moral or legal persons?  These questions are likely to arise sooner or later for most law students.  This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107930843982040364'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107930843982040364'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/03/legal-theory-lexicon-027.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107870697935064667</id><published>2004-03-07T16:49:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-02-12T06:15:25.746-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 026: Rules, Standards, and PrinciplesIntroduction
Early on in law school, law students begin to realize that legal norms are not all cut from the same cloth.  Some rules provide "bright lines," others "fuzzy lines," and yet others, no lines at all.  The "reasonable person" test in tort law constrains in a very different way than does the rule against perpetuities in property.</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107870697935064667'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107870697935064667'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/03/legal-theory-lexicon-026-rules.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107808640117853014</id><published>2004-02-29T13:26:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-01-23T14:50:33.190-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 025: Social Welfare FunctionsIntroduction
One of the key ideas in contemporary economic theory in general and law and economics in particular is the social welfare function.  Law students without a background in economics might be put off by the fact that social welfare functions are expressed in mathematical notation, but there is no reason to be intimidated.  The basic </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107808640117853014'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107808640117853014'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/02/legal-theory-lexicon-025-social.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107750082003918731</id><published>2004-02-22T17:47:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-01-16T12:57:38.036-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 024: Balancing TestsIntroduction
Balancing tests are ubiquitous in American law.  From the Due Process Clause to the Freedom of Speech and from the federal joinder rules to personal jurisdiction, U.S. law makes the outcome of legal disputes dependant on the balancing of various interests and factors.  Law students quickly become familiar with the idea of a balancing test, </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107750082003918731'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107750082003918731'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/02/legal-theory-lexicon-024-balancing.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107687122133709225</id><published>2004-02-15T10:53:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-01-22T04:36:11.623-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 023: Procedural JusticeIntroduction
Recently, the Legal Theory Lexicon provided a very general entry on the the topic of justice.  The notion of justice can be analyzed in many ways, but one good place to start is with Aristotle.  Aristotle divides the topic of justice into two main parts, corrective justice and distributive justice.  Distributive justice concerns the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107687122133709225'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107687122133709225'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/02/legal-theory-lexicon-023-procedural.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107625328489083063</id><published>2004-02-08T07:14:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-01-15T06:14:33.563-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 022: IntentionIntroduction
Was it intentional? Did he intend to kill? What were the original intentions of the framers of the United States Constitution? "Intention" is an important concept for legal theory.  On the one hand, "intention" figures prominently in theories of criminal law and tort law.  On the other hand, constitutional theory is interested in the idea of "the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107625328489083063'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107625328489083063'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/02/legal-theory-lexicon-022.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107566670093859202</id><published>2004-02-01T13:18:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-01-08T17:35:32.606-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 021: Speech ActsIntroduction
Speech act theory will forever be associated with the great J. L. Austin, the Oxford philosopher whose work in the 1950s had an enormous influence on analytic philosophy.  One of Austin's core insights is reflected in the title of his William James lectures, delivered at Harvard in 1955, How to Do Things with Words.  When we use language, we don't</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107566670093859202'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107566670093859202'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/02/legal-theory-lexicon-021-speech.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107514211788026110</id><published>2004-01-26T10:35:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2006-01-01T04:39:29.983-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 020: CausationIntroduction
Causation is one of the basic conceptual tools of legal analysis.  And for most purposes, we can get along with a notion of causation that is both vague and ambiguous.  In the world of medium sized physical objects (automobiles, pedestrians, etc.), our judgments about causation rarely depend on conceptual niceties.  The driver’s negligence caused </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107514211788026110'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107514211788026110'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/01/legal-theory-lexicon-020.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107447347603762628</id><published>2004-01-18T16:51:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-12-25T08:48:48.416-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 019: OriginalismIntroduction
There are many different theories of constitutional interpretation, but the most controversial and also perhaps the most influential is "originalism"--actually a loosely-knit family of constitutional theories.  The idea that courts would look to evidence from the constitutional convention, the ratification debates, The Federalist Papers, and the </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107447347603762628'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107447347603762628'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/01/legal-theory-lexicon-019.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107385010432371641</id><published>2004-01-11T11:41:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2004-01-12T16:16:01.390-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal theory Lexicon 018: JusticeIntroduction
The connection between law and justice is a deep one.  We have "Halls of Justice," "Justices of the Supreme Court," and "the administration of justice."  We know that "justice" is one of the central concepts of legal theory, but it is also vague and ambiguous.  This post provides an introductory roadmap to the concept of justice.  Subsequent entries </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107385010432371641'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107385010432371641'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/01/legal-theory-lexicon-018.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107322292941220178</id><published>2004-01-04T05:28:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-12-18T11:14:48.246-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 017: The Rule of LawIntroduction
This installment of the Legal Theory Lexicon provides a very short introduction to the idea of "the rule of law," aimed as usual at law students (especially first year law students) with an interest in legal theory.
What is the Rule of Law?
The ideal of the rule of law, which can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle,  is deeply embedded</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107322292941220178'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107322292941220178'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2004/01/legal-theory-lexicon-017-rule-of.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107262564880810715</id><published>2003-12-28T07:34:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2003-12-28T07:35:53.670-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 016: Positive and Normative Legal TheoryIntroduction
One of the most fundamental distinctions in legal theory is that between "positive legal theory" and "normative legal theory."  This post provides a very brief introduction to the distinction, aimed at law students (especially first years) with an interest in legal theory.
The core idea of the distinction between positive</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107262564880810715'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107262564880810715'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/12/legal-theory-lexicon-016-positive-and.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107202232168641751</id><published>2003-12-21T07:58:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-04-17T19:00:20.166-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 015: TransparencyIntroduction
Sooner or later, most law students encounter the idea that "transparency" (as opposed to "opaqueness") is a desirable characteristic in markets, procedures, and governance institutions (both private and public).  But what is "transparency" and why is it a good thing?  This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon provides a very brief introduction to </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107202232168641751'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107202232168641751'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/12/legal-theory-lexicon-015.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107143117492203157</id><published>2003-12-14T11:46:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2004-11-28T07:50:14.810-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 014: Fact and ValueIntroduction
Law students quickly learn that normative argument is an integral part of the law school experience.  And sooner or later, they are likely to encounter what is called the fact/value distinction.  Of course, the relationship between fact and value is a deep and complex philosophical topic.  Even a survey of the basic topics would take us far </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107143117492203157'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107143117492203157'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/12/legal-theory-lexicon-014-fact-and.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107108579462923584</id><published>2003-12-07T11:49:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2004-12-19T08:33:01.540-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 013: Conduct Rules and Decision Rules
The target audience of Legal Theory Lexicon is law students, especially first year law students, with an interest in legal theory.  Best of luck on your exams!  Here is a very short entry to provide a very brief break from studying:Substantive rules of law (such as the rules of torts, contract, and property) are usually assumed to be </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107108579462923584'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107108579462923584'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/12/legal-theory-lexicon-013-conduct-rules.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-107022004008710146</id><published>2003-11-30T11:20:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-11-13T05:42:10.800-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 012: Virtue EthicsIntroduction
The Legal Theory Lexicon already includes posts on Deontology and Utilitarianism--representing two important families of ethical theory.  This week, the Lexicon provides an introduction to virtue ethics.  As always, the Lexicon provides a quick and dirty summary with an eye to law students (especially first-year law students) with an interest in</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107022004008710146'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/107022004008710146'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/11/legal-theory-lexicon-012-virtue.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106961201321647437</id><published>2003-11-23T10:26:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-11-06T04:47:56.513-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 011: Second BestIntroduction
The post provides a very basic introduction to the idea of "second bes."  The term "second best" originated in a famous 1956 article by Lipsey and Lancaster (see bibliography), and it was originally used as a technical economic concept.  Despite its technical origins, the idea behind the second best is very general: sometimes the ideal solution to</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106961201321647437'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106961201321647437'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/11/legal-theory-lexicon-011-second.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106961185424345970</id><published>2003-11-16T10:23:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-10-30T05:54:48.050-08:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 010: DeontologyIntroduction
Two weeks ago, the Legal Theory Lexicon explored utilitarianism, an approach to normative moral theory that has had an enormous influence on legal thought.  This week, I take up one of utilitarianism's main rivals, deonotology.  Deontological moral theories vary in myriad ways, but the focal point for deontology is the concept of duty with its </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106961185424345970'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106961185424345970'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/11/legal-theory-lexicon-010.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106839831637951910</id><published>2003-11-09T09:18:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-10-23T06:12:30.836-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 009: Public ReasonIntroduction
How should citizens in a modern pluralist democracy debate and discuss public affairs?  What kinds of reasons are appropriate in the context of judicial opinions, legislative debate, or administrative decisionmaking?  There is wide agreement that the government should not censor public debate about politics, at least not without very good reason</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106839831637951910'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106839831637951910'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/11/legal-theory-lexicon-009-public.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106781359114560171</id><published>2003-11-02T14:53:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2005-10-16T06:31:20.713-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 008: UtilitarianismIntroduction
This installment of the Legal Theory Lexicon is an introduction to utilitarian moral and political philosophy tailored to law students (especially first-year law students) with an interest in legal theory.

Law students learn early on that classroom discussion of cases and statutes may begin with questions about what the rule is but is likely </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106781359114560171'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106781359114560171'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/11/legal-theory-lexicon-008.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106728464673618937</id><published>2003-10-26T11:57:00.000-08:00</published><updated>2004-10-16T19:46:10.473-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon  007: The Prisoner's DilemmaIntroduction
One of the most useful tools in analyzing legal rules and the policy problems to which they apply is game theory.  The basic idea of game theory is simple.  Many human interactions can be modeled as games.  To use game theory, we build a simple model of a real world situations as a game.  Thus, we might model civil litigation as a </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106728464673618937'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106728464673618937'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/10/legal-theory-lexicon-007-prisoners.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106658300506257322</id><published>2003-10-19T10:03:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2004-10-10T08:11:24.446-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 006: The Veil of IgnoranceIntroduction
This installment in the Legal Theory Lexicon is intended to introduce law students (especially first years) to "the veil of ignorance"--an idea from political philosophy that has had an important influence on legal theory.
From the Ex Ante Perspective to the Veil of Ignorance
Law students quickly learn that law school focuses more </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106658300506257322'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106658300506257322'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/10/legal-theory-lexicon-006-veil-of.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106600290145784399</id><published>2003-10-12T16:55:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2003-10-15T15:29:58.463-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 005: HoldingsAnd what is the holding, Ms. Sanchez?
Introduction
It used to be the case that an endless investigation of the difference between holding and dictum was a central preoccupation of the first year of law school.  Nowadays, depending on which law school you attend and which set of instructors you are assigned, it is perfectly conceivable that you might make it all</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106600290145784399'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106600290145784399'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/10/legal-theory-lexicon-005-holdingsand.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106600284897692218</id><published>2003-10-05T16:54:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2003-10-12T16:54:21.036-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 004: The Reasonable PersonWho is the reasonable person and why hasn't she been attending class?
Introduction
Good morning from Newton, Massachusetts.  Today's Legal theory Lexicon is about the "reasonable person," who used to be the "reasonable man" and is now occasionally the "reasonable woman."  This topic was suggested to me by my host and friend, the eminently </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106600284897692218'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106600284897692218'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/10/legal-theory-lexicon-004-reasonable.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106476848932466492</id><published>2003-09-28T10:01:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2004-09-21T07:59:32.730-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 003: HypotheticalsIntroduction
The hypothetical (or "hypo") is so familiar to anyone who has received a legal education in the United States that you might ask, "Can there possibly be anything of theoretical interest in the hypothetical?"  And in the same vein, "We all know what hypos are."  The purpose of this post is to reflect on the "hypothetical," with the special </summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106476848932466492'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106476848932466492'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/09/legal-theory-lexicon-003.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106416522568836828</id><published>2003-09-21T10:27:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2003-09-21T10:27:05.436-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 002: The Coase TheoremThis is the second installment in the Legal Theory Lexicon, an experimental Sunday feature of Legal Theory Blog primarily aimed at law students.  Each week I introduce a basic concept or idea in legal theory.  This week the idea is the Coase theorem.  Ronald Coase is a member of the law and economics faculties at the University of Chicago and a winner of</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106416522568836828'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106416522568836828'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/09/legal-theory-lexicon-002-coase.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5812087.post-106355833712514874</id><published>2003-09-14T09:52:00.000-07:00</published><updated>2003-09-14T09:52:36.966-07:00</updated><title type='text'></title><summary type='text'>Legal Theory Lexicon 001: Ex Ante/Ex Post
If I had to select only one theoretical tool for a first-year law student to master, it would be the ex post/ex ante distinction.  (Of course, this is cheating, because there is a lot packed into the distinction.)  The terminology comes from law and economics, and here is the basic idea:The ex post perspective is backward looking.  From the ex post point</summary><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106355833712514874'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/5812087/posts/default/106355833712514874'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2003/09/legal-theory-lexicon-001-ex-anteex.html' title=''/><author><name>Lawrence Solum</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='16' height='16' src='http://img2.blogblog.com/img/b16-rounded.gif'/></author></entry></feed>
